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Introduction
PATTERNING RIGHTS CONSTITUTIONALISM: THIRTY YEARS
WITH THE CHARTER
BENJAMIN L. BERGER * & JAMIE CAMERON **
WRITING YEARS BEFORE THE PATRIATION of the Canadian constitution in 1982,
the great Canadian constitutional scholar, advocate, and poet, F.R. Scott reflected
on the moment of constitutional change and the political, normative, and even
aesthetic registers in which such a moment sounds:
Changing a constitution confronts a society with the most important choices, for in
the constitution will be found the philosophical principles and rules which largely
determine the relations of the individual and of cultural groups to one another and
to the state. If human rights and harmonious relations between cultures are forms of
the beautiful, then the state is a work of art that is never finished. Law thus takes its
place, in its theory and practice, among man’s highest and most creative activities.1

Did the poet overtake the constitutional scholar when Scott put pen to
paper? To the contrary, the life and travails of the Canadian constitution thirty
years since the Constitution Act, 1982,2 and the introduction of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,3 have proven the truth of Scott’s words, in all of the creative
struggle, ambition, and cultural complexity that they reflect.
In those thirty years, the Charter has reached a point of maturity that enables
us to reflect from a wider perspective on how rights protection has transformed
Canada’s legal and political culture. As Michael Ignatieff suggests in his preface
to this special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal, the story of the Charter at
*
**
1.
2.
3.

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
Frank R. Scott, Essays on the Constitution: Aspects of Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto
and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977) at ix.
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
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home is one of both continuity and significant change. In Scott’s terms, “human
rights and harmonious relations between cultures” are “forms of the beautiful” that
defined our tradition long before the Charter. Yet by stitching a rights-protecting
instrument into the Canadian constitutional fabric, the Charter afforded the
Canadian public, politicians, and legal actors a new language of social and political
justice. Although this language shares a lexicon with modern universal rights
movements and with rights-protecting instruments in other traditions, its syntax
remained insistently Canadian. Sujit Choudhry’s contribution to this volume
shows how this is so, offering a perspective on how the concepts of religious freedom
and equality expressed in the Charter may be shaped by the deeper roots
of cultural difference and constitutional history based in Quebec’s distinctive
history within Canada. John Borrows’ article on Aboriginal treaty rights
and violence against women similarly shows, albeit in a very different context,
the way in which the new languages of the 1982 Constitution offered—and
may continue to offer—promise and resources for progressive change. Yet
he also shows that a new text—and even a new configuration of power within
the branches of government— has as yet proven insufficient to lift the anchor
on transformative change in the direction of social and historical justice. In her
assessment of the social justice legacy of the first thirty years of the Charter,
Margot Young points to the persistent influence of fundamental philosophical
and political commitments in shaping and limiting the progressive potential of
constitutional adjudication. Her article in this volume shows the provocative mix of
transformation and continuity, and of meaningful legal victories and disappointing
social justice shortfalls, that has characterized constitutional life with the Charter.
The historical particularities surrounding the introduction of the Charter underscore in dramatic fashion this dynamic, ever-evolving character of constitutional life.
Over a century after Canada’s constitution was established, the Charter reconfigured
constitutional democracy and reshaped the distribution of legal and political
authority within the institutions of government. And as is often the case with
new languages, with a discourse of rights and judicial review came new modes
of thought and new possibilities for criticism. The Charter made Canada a
hotspot for constitutional theorizing and reflection on the political philosophy that
subtends our constitutional tradition in particular and the nature of constitutions
in general. In her article in this issue, Avigail Eisenberg reflects on the mutual
imbrications of rights discourse, identity politics, judicial review, and democratic
institutions that have emerged over the course of three decades under the Charter.
Her critical review of the Charter’s legacy, and the risks and promises of identity
politics in rights litigation offers rich insight into the shifting nature of our
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political and institutional commitments. Colleen Sheppard similarly draws
lessons from the Charter experience about how the core project of constitutionalism
might be conceived. In her contribution to this issue, she considers the democratic
import of rights-protecting constitutions inhering in their process-based effects—
namely, their influence on voice and inclusion—rather than principally in the
substantive content of their normative prescriptions. Gavin Anderson picks up
the important thread of critical legal scholarship on rights and judicial review,
so active in Canada after the introduction of the Charter, and imagines the
future fault lines and frontiers in critical constitutional thought; he invites
us to imagine a sociological and transnational turn in constitutional theory that
would be responsive to challenges of social justice in modern democratic life. The
contributors to this special issue remind us that critical reflection on the legacy of
the Charter is also a kind of philosophical reflection on the nature of constitutions
and political communities at large.
In its distinctive agonistic expression of democratic supremacy and rights
protection, the Canadian constitutional model—and the operation and impact
of the Charter in particular—has influenced constitutional design, practice, and
theory around the world. Since 1982, the Charter has been looked to in the
design of parliamentary and constitutional bills of rights in New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, Australian states, South Africa, and Israel. As a result, the 1982
Constitution moved Canada into a central position in the comparative study of
rights constitutionalism. In this way, the 1982 Constitution moved Canada into a
central position in comparative rights constitutionalism, and recent exercises in
constitutional design have bypassed the exceptionalist system of American rights
protection in favour of transformative approaches that recognize that rights
protection is not singular, hegemonic, or static. Canada’s Charter has demonstrated that protecting rights within a tradition of representative democracy is
a matter of institutional design and has shown how key institutions—namely,
courts and legislatures—can share that responsibility. Meanwhile, Canada has
also modelled an alternative conception of rights that is inclusive of collective
and community identities, and that to some extent protects affirmative entitlements. Indeed, in his article in this issue, Mark Tushnet argues that, in the last
thirty years, the distinctive model represented by the Charter has made the
Canadian Constitution and the Supreme Court of Canada more influential
from a comparative perspective than the US Constitution and the US Supreme
Court. Tushnet traces this ascendancy in influence to a variety of features of
constitutional life in Canada, including the age of the Charter, the embrace and
elaboration of proportionality tests, and the rejection of originalist interpretation
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(save for the area of Aboriginal rights, as John Borrows argues). Rosalind Dixon
emphasizes that it is not just the structural features of the Canadian Constitution,
but also the patterns of logic and reasoning that have developed in the last
thirty years in Canada, that offer Canadian lessons for comparative constitutional
design. Dixon suggests that the Canadian experience shows the way in which
particular conceptions of the prohibited grounds of discrimination can variously
nourish or inhibit the progressive potential of equality guarantees. Evincing a
complicated comfort with the tensions of modern constitutionalism—holding
together, for example, equally fierce commitments to legislative sovereignty and
the supremacy of rights, to the respect for difference and the protection of
equality—Canada and its Charter have contributed important ideas to global
patterns of rights constitutionalism.
The articles that form this special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal were
written for a symposium held at Osgoode Hall Law School in September of
2012, a symposium that took the 30th anniversary of the Charter as an occasion
to reflect on the state of critical and comparative constitutional rights theory. This
event brought together a group of leading constitutional scholars from Canada,
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, to discuss practical,
theoretical, and comparative dimensions of the study of the Charter and of rights
constitutionalism more generally. The day’s conversations were facilitated by four
discussants, who are distinguished constitutional scholars in their own right—Sonia
Lawrence, Robert Leckey, Jennifer Nedelsky, and Bruce Ryder—and were joined in
by graduate and J.D. students from Osgoode Hall Law School, the University
of Toronto, and McGill University. As guest editors, we are grateful to the student
editors of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal and to the editor-in-chief, Professor Stepan
Wood, for their skill and professionalism in bringing this collection to publication.
Together, these articles offer a formidable collection of insights on rights within
democracies, on how societies and institutions accommodate change, on how
political communities and institutions speak to each other, and on how constitutional transformations and innovations are shared and developed as they move
across borders. Though they were occasioned by the 30th anniversary of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, these articles collectively look forward, imagining the
frontiers and points of struggle for constitutional justice, and participating in
the core task of all constitutional thought: wrestling with the role of state and
community in the pursuit of social and political justice.
“[T]he state,” as Scott wisely observes, “is a work of art that is never finished.”4
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